My main research interests lie in Epistemology using traditional, formal, and experimental methods, as well as the History of Early Analytic Philosophy.
In Epistemology, I'm mainly interested in investigating different notions of risk, the role and relevance of probabilistic evidence, and different notions of epistemic rationality. My experimental work focuses on variations of risk and recklessness judgements.
In previous work I have developed a theory of justification that I term the 'normic theory', and tried to apply it to various problems in epistemology and beyond. I am currently exploring whether aspects of this theory could offer a new way of thinking about the notion of risk - and whether this could, in turn, have significance for areas such as decision theory, legal reasoning and the ethics of risk imposition.
I am interested in the epistemology and ethics of recklessness. A risk can be reckless even if the agent is lucky and things turn out well. My research focuses on what makes a risk reckless (and so blameworthy). I am also interested in how the epistemic standing of moral beliefs affects moral recklessness, and in exploring possible symmetries between moral and factual recklessness.
Giada works on epistemology (including social, and legal epistemology), normativity, and the philosophy of perception. In particular, she loves to think about anything that deals with evidence. As part of the Varieties of Risk Project, she'll investigate what it means to manage risk rationally, with a specific focus on risk assessment in criminal and asylum law.
Besides evidence, Giada's passions include singing, playing the piano, reading novels, and eating sun-dried tomatoes.
Dylan Balfour Dylan.Balfour@ed.ac.uk
Dylan is a PhD student at the University of Edinburgh. He works in normative ethics and decision theory and is particularly interested in the decision-making implications of existential risk.
Lilith Newton Lilith.Newton@ed.ac.uk
Lilith Newton is a PhD researcher in Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh, supervised by Martin Smith. Her thesis concerns the instrumental and intrinsic (dis)value of doubt, conceived of as epistemic anxiety: an emotional response to epistemic risk.
My research develops an antirealist solution to the problem of epistemic scepticism. I am particularly interested in how function-first arguments and everyday intuitions regarding epistemic possibility and risk support various forms of antirealism about knowledge discourse.
[Petronella Randell] email@example.com
I'm a SASP PhD student working on transformative experience, decision theory, and authenticity. My main interests are in epistemology and the psychology of decision-making.
Xintong Wei is a PhD student on the St Andrews/Stirling Philosophy Programme (SASP). Xintong works on topics that situate at the intersections between epistemology, normativity and philosophy of mind. Her thesis investigates the normative relation between truth and belief. Her wider research interests include moral epistemology, theory of mental action and history of philosophy (ancient Greek and Chinese philosophy)