Varieties of Risk

AHRC sponsored research project

Short Project Description

The notion of risk plays a central role in economics, finance, health, psychology, law and elsewhere–and is prevalent in managing challenges and resources in day-to-day life. Almost all of the existing literature on risk takes it for granted that there is one and only one legitimate notion of risk: the probabilistic notion on which the risk of an event or state of affairs is (partly) determined by its probability. The primary aim of this research project is to challenge this monist view of risk and provide a philosophical framework for a pluralist perspective, on which there are multiple, equally legitimate, notions of risk. This new framework will then be applied to crucial questions about risk that arise in psychology, criminal law, outdoor sports, and risk management.

Selection of work that was supported by the project (June 2023).

Ebert P, Durbach I. (2023). Expert and lay judgements of danger and recklessness in adventure sports. Journal of Risk Research, (2), doi: 10.1080/13669877.2022.2091001

Ebert P, Milne P. (2022). Methodological and conceptual challenges in rare and severe event forecast verification. Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences, (2), doi: 10.5194/nhess-22-539-2022

Ebert P, Morreau M. (2022). Safety in numbers: how social choice theory can inform avalanche risk management. Journal of Adventure Education and Outdoor Learning, doi: 10.1080/14729679.2021.2012216

Ebert, P. A., Comerford D. (2022). SAIS User Survey Summary Report.

Ebert, P.A., Zweifel B. (2022). Wisdom of Crowds. Gruppenentscheidungen in den Bergen. (989190235). Innsbruck, Austria: Österreichischer Alpenverein, Deutscher Alpenverein, Schweizer Alpen-Club, Südtiroler Alpenverein.

Field C, Re S. (2021). Risky Tradeoffs in The Expanse. The Expanse and Philosophy - So Far Out into the Darkness (pp. 179-185). Wiley.

Field C, Jacinto B. (2022). Bridge Principles and Epistemic Norms. Erkenntnis, doi: 10.1007/s10670-022-00599-7

Field C. (2021). Anti-Exceptionalism About Requirements of Epistemic Rationality. Acta analytica : philosophy and psychology, 36(3), pp. 423-441. doi: 10.1007/s12136-020-00450-0

Field C. (2021). Moral Appraisal for Everyone: Neurodiversity, Epistemic Limitations, and Responding to the Right Reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, (3), doi: 10.1007/s10677-021-10212-5

Field C. (2022). Unsettled Thoughts: A Theory of Degrees of Rationality, by Julia Staffel. Mind, (522), doi: 10.1093/mind/fzaa070

Field C. (2022). At least you tried: The value of De Dicto concern to do the right thing. Philosophical Studies, (9), doi: 10.1007/s11098-022-01791-9

Fratantonio G, Lasonen-Aarnio M. (2022). Refuting two dilemmas for infallibilism. Philosophical Studies, (8), doi: 10.1007/s11098-022-01782-w

Fratantonio G. (2021). Evidence, Risk, and Proof Paradoxes: Pessimism about the Epistemic Project. The International Journal of Eviden.1177/13657127211035831

Fratantonio G. (2021). No Infelicity for the Infallibilist. Theoria Doi: 10.1111/theo.12317

Fratantonio G. (2023). Can epistemic paternalistic practices make us better epistemic agents?. Educational Theory.

Fratantonio G. (2023). Evidential Internalism and Evidential Externalism. In Lasonen-Aarnio M, Littlejohn C. (Ed.), Routledge Hanndbook for the Philosophy of Evidence Routledge.

Smith M. (2021). Civil liability and the 50%+ standard of proof. The International Journal of Evidence & Proof, (3), doi: 10.1177/13657127211011207

Smith M. (2021). More on Normic Support and the Criminal Standard of Proof. Mind, (519), doi: 10.1093/mind/fzab005t

Smith M. (2022). Risky belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, doi: 10.1111/phpr.12894

Smith M. (2022). Two accounts of assertion. Synthese, (3), doi: 10.1007/s11229-022-03745-4

Smith M. (2022). Is  K  KP a luminous condition?. Asian Journal of Philosophy, (1), doi: 10.1007/s44204-022-00009-3

Wei X. (2022). Believing for truth and the model of epistemic guidance. Inquiry, doi: 10.1080/0020174x.2022.2126391t

Selection of work that led up to the project.

Ebert, P., Smith, M., and Durbach I. (2020). "Varieties of Risk." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. pp.1-24. Open Access.

Smith, M. (forthcoming). "Against legal probabilism" in Robson, J. and Hoskins, Z. (eds), Truth and Trial. Routledge.

Ebert, P. (2019). "Bayesian Reasoning in avalanche terrain: a theoretical study."* Journal for Adventure Education and Outdoor Research*, 19(1), 84-95. 2019. Open Access.

Smith, M (2018). "When does evidence suffice for conviction?" Mind, 127(508): 1193-1218. Open Access.

Ebert, P, Smith, M., and Durbach, I. (2018). “Lottery Judgements: a philosophical and experimental study.” Philosophical Psychology, 31(1), 110-138. Open Access.

Smith, M. (2017). "Why throwing 92 heads in a row is not surprising." Philosophers' Imprint, 17(21), 2017. Open Access

Smith, M. (2016). Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ebert, P. and Robertson, S. (2013). “A Plea for Risk” (with Simon Robertson). Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 73, pp. 45-­64. 2013. We are grateful to copyright holder Royal Institute of Philosophy for making the paper generally available. The paper is published in: Open Access

Ebert, P. and Photopoulou, T. (2013). "Bayes' beacon: avalanche prediction, competence and evidence for competence. Modelling the effect of competent and incompetent predictions of highly improbable events". Proceedings of the International Snow Science Workshop (ISSW), Grenoble, France, pp.363-70. 2013. (NOTE: ERRATUM ADDED AUGUST 2018). Open Access.